Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in South-East Asia
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Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in South-East Asia

Amitav Acharya
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Promoting human security: from concept to action

During the last decade, human security has become a central concern to many countries, institutions and social actors searching for innovative ways and means of tackling the many non-military threats to peace and security. Indeed, human security underlines the complex links, often ignored or underestimated, between disarmament, human rights and development. Today, in an increasingly globalized world, the most pernicious threats to human security emanate from the conditions that give rise to genocide, civil war, human rights violations, global epidemics, environmental degradation, forced and slave labour, and malnutrition. All the current studies on security thus have to integrate the human dimension of security.

Thus, since the publication of the United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 *Human Development Report* on new dimensions of human security, major efforts have been undertaken to refine the very concept of human security through research and expert meetings, to put human security at the core of the political agenda, at both national and regional levels and, most important of all, to engage in innovative action in the field to respond to the needs and concerns of the most vulnerable populations. Two landmarks in this process were the creation of the Human Security Network in 1999, made up of fourteen countries from all regions, which holds ministerial meetings every year; and the publication of the 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*, which has called for a global initiative to promote human security.

UNESCO has been closely associated with these efforts from the outset, in particular in the framework of its action aimed
at promoting a culture of peace. Thus, as of 1994, the Organization launched a series of regional and national projects relating to the promotion of a new concept of security, ensuring the participation of regional, national and local institutions, and involving a wide array of actors, including the armed forces, in Central America and Africa.

On the basis of the experience acquired through the implementation of those projects, human security became a central concern for the Organization as a whole. A plan of action for the promotion of human security at the regional level was adopted in 2000, as a result of the deliberations of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on the theme ‘What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?’, held at UNESCO Headquarters; and in 2002 human security became one of the Organization’s twelve strategic objectives as reflected in its Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007. This strategic objective is closely linked to UNESCO’s contribution to the eradication of poverty, in particular extreme poverty, to the promotion of human rights, as well as to its action in the field of natural sciences, in particular regarding the prevention of conflicts relating to the use of water resources.

The choice of adopting regional approaches to human security has been most fruitful to date. In Africa, UNESCO, in close cooperation with the Institute for Security Studies of South Africa, has initiated action aiming at the formulation of a regional human security agenda, addressing conflict prevention and many of the issues raised in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative, which UNESCO has fully supported from its inception. In Latin America, cooperation with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Chile in 2001, 2003 and 2005 led to important discussions of human security issues in the region, and to the formulation of policy recommendations that have been submitted to the ministerial meetings of the Human Security Network and to regional intergovernmental meetings on
hemispheric security. In East Asia, building on important progress
made by subregional academic and political institutions, UNESCO,
in collaboration with the Korean National Commission for
UNESCO and Korea University, organized the 2003 meeting on
Human Security in East Asia, whose results were widely
disseminated. In March 2005, UNESCO and the Regional Human
Security Center in Amman (Jordan) jointly organized the
International Conference on Human Security in the Arab States.
UNESCO developed similar projects in Central Asia, in
cooperation with the OSCE Academy, in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), in
September 2005, and in South-East Asia, in collaboration with
ASEAN, in Jakarta (Indonesia), in October 2006. After a workshop
on Human Security in Europe: Perspectives East and West,
organized at UNESCO by the Center for Peace and Human
Security in Paris, in June 2006, the cycle of regional consultations
was concluded in Africa in March 2007.

With a view to opening new perspectives for focused
research, adequate training, preparation of pilot projects, and to
further consolidate public policy and public awareness on human
security issues, UNESCO has launched a series of publications:
Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational
Frameworks. These emphasize three important elements in order to
translate the concept of human security into action: (a) the need to
have a solid ethical foundation, based on shared values, leading to the
commitment to protect human dignity which lies at the very core
of human security; (b) buttressing that ethical dimension by placing
existing and new normative instruments at the service of human
security, in particular by ensuring the full implementation of
instruments relating to the protection of human rights; and (c) the
need to reinforce the education and training component by better
articulating and giving enhanced coherence to all ongoing efforts,
focusing on issues such as education for peace and sustainable
development, training in human rights and enlarging the democratic
agenda to human security issues.
We hope that this series – each publication focusing on a specific region – will contribute to laying the foundations of an in-depth and sustained action for the promotion of human security, in which the individual has a key role to play.

*Moufida Goucha*
Introduction

I am proposing … that we here at the PMC consider setting up an ASEAN-PMC Caucus on Human Security (for) mapping out steps and strategies for long-term approach to the cure for and prevention of ‘human insecurity’ in our region.

Surin Pitsuwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand

Human security: the best deterrent to terrorism
Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of ASEAN

The pursuit of human security means that regional institutions must be change agents. They must have the political will to challenge the status quo. They must be given sufficient resources and the necessary mandate to alter situations. To pursue human security means to enhance the capability of regional organizations to advance universal values effectively and with greater autonomy from its dominant members and local interest groups.

M. C. Abad Jr, Director of the ASEAN Regional Forum Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat

The concept of human security has been with us for over a decade now, but has made little inroad into the security thinking
of South-East Asian states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with the three important exceptions quoted above. Part of the reason may be that South-East Asian governments feel they have had since the 1970s at least a 'comprehensive' notion of security and therefore, no further need for a concept that could be a passing fad. In this view, human security is simply a new label for old security challenges that the region has long recognized and addressed.

Another reason for the lack of interest in human security is the underlying suspicion that the notion represents a Western agenda, centring on such liberal values and approaches as human rights and humanitarian intervention, and giving short shrift to the economic and developmental priorities of the region. This suspicion has been evident in debates about the meaning of concepts revolving around 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want', which have accompanied, and to some extent thwarted, efforts by Western norm entrepreneurs to introduce the notion of human security into Asia and South-East Asia.

However, recent transnational dangers suffered by the region have blurred the distinction between traditional national security concerns and issues that might be included under the rubric of human security, whose main point of reference, as far as this report is concerned, is *acute human suffering*, including severe challenges to human dignity and safety. The Asian economic crisis during and after 1997, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 and the Indian Ocean tsunami that devastated coastal areas in Indonesia, Thailand and other South-East Asian nations in December 2004, along with the recurring haze problem and the latent danger of a major bird flu outbreak, have underscored the fact that major dangers to national and regional security in South-East Asia come from sources that have traditionally not formed part of the national security agenda of governments.

Against this backdrop, the main purpose of this report is to examine how the concept of 'human security' can serve as the basis
for a new approach to regional cooperation in South-East Asia, particularly by ASEAN. It is argued that making the idea of human security the basis for regional cooperation requires 'localizing' the idea within the existing security concepts and approaches of ASEAN. The major part examines the human security implications of three of the most severe transnational dangers that the region has faced since 1997 – the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 – as a way of highlighting and illustrating the relevance of human security as a framework for security analysis. It does not attempt to be comprehensive, covering all the referent objectives and issues of human security. For example, the incidence and impact of armed conflicts on human security in South-East Asia have been well documented by the Human Security Report issued by the University of British Columbia (Canada) Human Security Centre (HSC, 2005), whose findings on South-East Asia are analysed below. This report pays particular attention to the above crises. Such an approach provides a new and concrete empirical focus for the more abstract and conceptual debates about human security that have already taken place within and outside the region and have already proved their usefulness. Moreover, it takes a regional and regionalist perspective, rather than the country-by-country one found in many previous empirical studies on human security. In the above respects, it complements, rather than duplicates, an earlier study of human security in East Asia (including South-East Asia), commissioned by UNESCO and written by Prof. Shin-wha Lee of Korea University (Lee, 2004). This report not only pays more specific attention to the human security implications of regional crises, but also to the role of regional cooperation in addressing them.

A regional perspective to human security in South-East Asia is justified because this region has a well-established institution in ASEAN, with a track record of dealing with security challenges

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4 On the 'localization' of ideas and norms, see Acharya (2004b).
with a regional focus. Moreover, a regional focus for this report is timely as ASEAN is in the process of developing new institutional mechanisms for dealing with conflict and security issues in the region, including problems that have acute human security implications. These initiatives include the ASEAN Security Community (alongside ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community), as well as an ASEAN Charter. It is hence an opportune moment for ASEAN to rethink its principles and institutional mechanisms to make them more attuned to a human security agenda.

The report is divided into four parts: an examination of the concept of human security and some Asian responses to it; a look at recent challenges to human security in the region, focusing on the impact of three crises (with a brief section on the human security implications of terrorism); an analysis of the relationship between human security and international and regional cooperation in the context of these crises; and some policy suggestions about how to promote the idea and practice of human security in South-East Asia.

5 For a regional perspective on human development (hence subsumed by human security) in South-East Asia, see UNDP (2005b).
South-East Asia and the concept of human security

It is now accepted that contemporary understanding of human security dates back to the 1994 Human Development Report from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1994). This report lists seven separate components of human security: economic security (assured basic income), food security (physical and economic access to food), health security (relative freedom from disease and infection), environmental security (access to sanitary water supply, clean air and a non-degraded land system), personal security (security from physical violence and threats), community security (security of cultural identity), and political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms) (Lodgaard, 2000).

Since publication of the 1994 report, there has been considerable debate over the meaning of human security, which has been too well-covered in the academic and policy literature to require repetition here. Briefly stated, a Canadian definition advanced by the then External Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy closely linked human security with freedom from fear, especially in the conflict zones of the world. In Asia and South-East Asia, on the other hand, a broader conception of human security, focusing on freedom from want, prevails.

6 This section draws on an earlier article that offered an extended discussion of the definitional and conceptual issues associated with the human security paradigm (Acharya, 2001).

Yet, South-East Asia historically has witnessed some of the worst violence of the twentieth century. The Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia killed about 1.7 million (about one quarter of the Cambodian population) during its brutal rule between 1975 and 1979. Anti-Communist riots that followed the transition from Sukarno to Suharto in the mid-1960s claimed about 400,000 lives (Schwarz, 1999, p. 20). The US war in Viet Nam produced 250,000 South Vietnamese, 1.1 million North Vietnamese and 60,000 American casualties (Olson, 1988; Tucker, 1999; US Department of Defense, n.d.). Ethnic and separatist movements in East Timor and Aceh have respectively claimed 200,000 and more than 2,000 lives (Wessel and Winhofer, 2001). While there are no proper collated figures for ethnic separatism in Myanmar – usually low-scale, random casualties and conflicts, 600,000 ‘internally-displaced persons’ from these conflicts have been recorded (US Department of State, 2003).

Table 1. Reported deaths from political violence in Asia by country (2002–03)*

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<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Notes:
- a. Futility figures are ‘best estimates’
- b. Non-state armed conflict is conflict in which at least one of the warring parties is a state, and that results in more than twenty-five battle-related deaths per calendar year.
- c. Non-state armed conflict is the use of force between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths per calendar year.
- d. One-sided violence is defined by Uppsala’s Conflict Data Programme as the use of force against civilians by the government of a state, or by a formally organized group, that results in at least twenty-five deaths per calendar year.
- e. Number of fatalities per 100,000 population, rounded to the nearest decimal. Population data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database for 2002.


8 Yale University Cambodian Genocide Program website. http://www.yale.edu/cgp/
The Human Security Report prepared by the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia, Canada (HSC, 2005), from which Table 1 is taken, offers many interesting snapshots of the mixed (good and bad news) state of human security in Asia and South-East Asia. On the good news side, the report suggests that since the end of the Korean War in 1953 there has been a clear but uneven decline in battle-deaths around the world, including South-East Asia. From 1946 to the mid-1970s, by far the highest battle-death tolls were on the battlefields of East Asia, South-East Asia and Oceania. But in 2003, these regions saw less than one-third of the number of armed conflicts they had experienced in 1978. This decline was due to increased prosperity, democratization and the ending of large-scale foreign intervention. After accounting for most of the world's battle-deaths from 1946 to the mid-1970s, East Asia, South-East Asia and Oceania have been free of major conflict since the fighting in Cambodia and Viet Nam, both South-East Asian states, ended.

But the single most important reason for the decline in battle-deaths over the past fifty years is the changing nature of warfare, especially the transition from large-scale conventional inter-state conflict to unconventional low-intensity conflict. The major wars of the 1950s to 1970s – the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War and the wars in Indochina – involved huge armies that deployed heavy conventional weapons and engaged in major battles. The warring parties were sustained by the superpowers and the death tolls were high. By the end of the century the nature of armed conflict had changed radically. Most of today's armed conflicts fall into one of two categories. The vast majority are so-called 'low-intensity' civil wars, almost all of which take place in the developing world. These use ill-trained, lightly armed forces, do not involve major military engagements and kill relatively few people. The other is 'asymmetric' conflict using high-tech weaponry against weaker opponents. Due to the extreme power imbalances, the durations of such conflict are usually short, with relatively few combat deaths compared with other major engagements of the Cold War period.
Yet, and this is the bad news which must not be forgotten because of the above trends, several South-East Asian countries were near the top of the list of Asia-Pacific nations that fought the most ‘international wars’ between 1946 and 2003. A sampling of the countries includes Thailand (six wars), Democratic Republic of Vietnam (five wars), and Republic of Vietnam (four wars). The other countries in the high categories include Australia (seven wars), China (six wars), and New Zealand (four wars).

South-East Asia was also the scene of the most brutal and far-reaching form of ‘politicide’ in Asia. Politicide describes policies that seek to destroy groups because of their political beliefs rather than religion or ethnicity. Genocide and politicide can take place during or after civil wars – as happened in Cambodia in 1975–79.

Internal conflicts have also been a serious challenge in South-East Asia. The most conflict-prone countries from 1946 to 2003, in terms of having experienced the greatest number of conflict-years,9 are Myanmar (232 conflict-years), India (156 conflict-years), Philippines (86 conflict-years), Democratic Republic of Vietnam (60 conflict-years), Indonesia (40 conflict-years), Cambodia (36 conflict-years), Republic of Vietnam (36 conflict-years), Thailand (35 conflict-years), and Australia (31 conflict-years). Myanmar, which was embroiled in six different intra-state conflicts, is the world’s most conflict-prone country.

Also on the negative side is increased militarization of the region as measured in terms of the ratio of security forces to the overall population. The HSC report cites a 1999 study of Asian militaries (North-East, South-East, and South Asia) which found that between 1975 and 1996 the ratio of security forces to population had risen by 29% in Thailand, 42% in Myanmar, 63% in China, 64% in Pakistan and 81% in Sri Lanka (Collier, 1999). Most of these

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9 It is possible for a country to be involved in two or more state-based armed conflicts in a given year and thus accumulate more than one conflict-year for each calendar year. Myanmar, for example, was embroiled in six different intra-state conflicts.
increases were the result of a build-up of paramilitary forces. Many paramilitaries, like those of Indonesia, have developed sinister reputations, with some being responsible for horrific acts of violence. But the trend towards the rise of paramilitaries is more pronounced in North-East Asia and South Asia than in South-East Asia. Armed more heavily than the police but more lightly than the military, the rapid growth of the paramilitaries is due to their inexpensiveness – for example China’s militarized police forces. The growth of paramilitary forces is one of the most significant recent changes in the global security landscape. In China and India – two of the five countries with the largest armed forces in the world – paramilitary forces now account for between one-third and one-half of total military personnel.

Mapping popular concerns about violence around the world, the Human Security Centre commissioned Ipsos-Reid to conduct a global survey of people’s fears and experiences of political and criminal violence in eleven countries, including India, Japan and Thailand. The survey showed marked divergences between perceived risks and actual experience. Half the Thai respondents believed that they would be victims of violence in the coming twelve months. Yet only 7% of Thais had been victims of any violent attack or threat during the previous five years. Just 1% of Indians and Japanese had personally experienced violence, but 10% and 14%, respectively, feared they would become crime victims in the next year. Only 9% of Indians polled wanted their governments to make fighting terrorism the top priority, despite the fact that 51% of them had rated terrorism as the threat of most concern to them personally. Only 2% of Thais and less than 6% of Japanese felt terrorism should be their government’s primary concern.

Despite the region’s past brush with human insecurity measured in terms of conflict and people’s persistent sense of fear, the concept of human security has found little resonance in the thinking and approach of South-East Asian governments. Why is this so? Three reasons stand out.
First, South-East Asian governments remain wedded to national or state security. Average public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP still falls far short of the spending military affairs. In fact, in 2000, the average 1.5% of their public budgets that South-East Asian countries dedicated to health spending was only a little more than half of the 2.4% spent on military expenditure. Education spending amounted to 2.7%. Military and social indicators in these countries show that human security concerns such as healthcare have not eclipsed national security concerns of military strategy, while education shows more promise, but only just.

Why the importance of national security over human security? To some extent, South-East Asia’s security predicament reflects the general state of Asian security. As I argued in a previous study:

As a region, Asia is hardly a Kantian paradise. It has more than its fair share of territorial disputes, other forms of inter-state rivalry, economic competition and great power intervention. The end of the Cold War has not led to the disappearance of these challenges. Indeed, most of the most serious conflicts in Asia predate the end of the Cold War and have not been moderated by its end. Hence, the importance of national security does have its basis in the traditional security problematic of Westphalian states … The salience of national security in Asia also owes [much] to the international power structure and rivalries. The Cold War institutionalised the national security paradigm throughout the region as the superpowers helped their allies and clients to devote vast resources to the military sector in support of their geopolitical ambitions. Generous arms transfers and military basing arrangements supported regimes which gave priority to national security even though many of them were committing gross violations of human security (Acharya, 2003).

While most South-East Asian policy-makers argue that national and state security need not be incompatible with human security and that the former is a precondition for the latter, there
are some areas of tension between the two approaches. Hence, a second reason for the limited acceptance of the human security concept in South-East Asia has to do with the fact that some of the initial Western articulation of the concept associated it with intervention, especially humanitarian intervention. Indeed, a suspicion that creating mechanisms and institutions to promote human security might require states to relinquish their sovereignty is a key reason for the wariness of South-East Asian governments, with their deep attachment to Westphalian sovereignty, to embrace human security. As Surin Pitsuwan, former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the Commission on Human Security, put it:

Where is human security in Southeast Asia: not very far? If there is any region that is suspicious of external involvement or jealous of the concept of sovereignty, it is Southeast Asia. The concept of sovereignty is still very sacred here. ASEAN is yet to adopt human security.10

South-East Asian policy-makers realize that some of the initial formulations of the concept of human security focused more on freedom from fear, rather than freedom from want. The latter, reflecting the Japanese approach, is deemed in South-East Asia to be a softer, more considerate, less provocative interpretation of human security. Reinforcing this belief is the fact that some of the most ardent champions of human security in Asia come from backgrounds that have stressed the concept of human security as first and foremost a development-oriented concept, or at least have advocated both freedom from want and freedom from fear. For example, Amartya Sen, co-chair of the Human Security Commission, comes from a development economics background, while championing ‘development as freedom’. As Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, Surin Pitsuwan

10 Personal interview, October 2005.
stressed the need for human security as a way of lifting Asia out of the misery caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997.

But South-East Asia’s initial misgivings about human security may be changing. One of the clear articulations of a more receptive attitude in ASEAN towards human security can be found in the words of M. C. Abad Jr, a senior official at the ASEAN Secretariat. Although this is not necessarily representative of the attitude of the ASEAN countries as a whole, it does provide a clue to some of the new thinking in the region towards human security:

National governments and regional institutions must preserve and extend the progress made in securing states against the external threat of war while finding ways to safeguard people against internal threats of repression and gross deprivation of basic human needs. While the universal concern for human security should not be used as a cover to undermine the political integrity of nation states, particularly in the developing world, regional and national security should not be used as an argument to perpetuate gross violation and deprivation of human security and against international intervention (Abad, 2000, p. 2).

A number of developments have underscored the need for regional governments to rethink the relevance of human security in South-East Asia. The most important catalyst for what might become a more receptive attitude in ASEAN towards human security has to do with the severe transnational challenges faced by South-East Asian societies since 1997. A key episode was the Asian financial crisis in 1997, whose impact, measured in terms of increased poverty levels and damage to the social, educational and other aspects of the well-being of people in crisis-hit countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea, were nothing short of catastrophic. This economic crisis was followed by other new transnational threats, such as the haze out of Indonesia, 9/11, the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2001 and the
outbreak of SARS and the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004. Although rooted in divergent causes, these threats share some important characteristics. First, the crises arrived suddenly and unexpectedly. They had not been predicted. Few had imagined the scale of the financial shocks and currency devaluations of 1997 that originated in Thailand and spread through the region, thereby marking an end to the heyday of the 'Asian economic miracle'.

A second feature of these crises, with the exception of the tsunami, is their link with globalization. The financial crisis of 1997 would not have been possible without the dependence of the countries of the region on foreign investment and their openness to global financial transfers. Terrorism thrives on transnational illegal money transfers and diffusion of radical Islamic ideologies. The SARS crisis shows the danger of the rapid spread of pandemics made possible by international tourism and travel.

Third, many if not all threats to human security are transnational in origin. They arise from a close interaction between domestic vulnerabilities and external developments. They replicate themselves across many national and regional boundaries. Interdependence and globalization serve as transmission belts for these threats. Challenges to human security, such as poverty caused by financial crises or infectious diseases such as SARS, can afflict a country even if it maintains the most secure territorial border and extends its sovereignty to the remotest parts therein.

As such, these crises have underscored the limits of a security paradigm that expects the most dangerous challenges to security to come from invasion or insurgency. They also show the extent to which regime security can be severely undermined by acute crises of human insecurity. The collapse of the Suharto regime highlighted the fact that security of the authoritarian developmental regimes cannot be insulated from crises that produce large-scale human suffering. There is a growing
realization in the region that in facing transnational dangers in an era of globalization, the state cannot claim a monopoly in containing such dangers or providing solutions. The role of other actors, such as civil society groups, is critical. Over time, this may facilitate a slow but discernable shift towards human security, as a complement, if not an alternative to, the traditional national security paradigm.

Moreover, these challenges have contributed to a greater realization that human security, in its broader aspects, matters. The economic crisis exerted downward pressure on military spending, a key indicator and driver of national security. At least the crisis makes it harder for governments to increase defence spending without substantial justification. Although defence spending has continued to take the lion’s share of national budgets, the Asian crisis, nonetheless, prompted governments to pay more attention to social expenditures in order to avoid further and future instability. The SARS crisis highlighted the need for better health facilities, even in advanced economies such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. The challenge posed by terrorism highlighted the need for personal safety and the security of public space, although this has been somewhat countered by the growing intrusiveness of governments and the curtailment of civil liberties in both Western and Asian countries. Indeed, as mentioned at the outset, the current Secretary-General of ASEAN, Ong Keng Yong, has stressed a ‘human security’ approach to combating terrorism in South-East Asia. (See Table 6 on page 65 for an outline of how terrorism has affected regional cooperation in South-East Asia.)

It is also noteworthy that crises such as SARS, the tsunami and bird flu have brought to the fore the realization of the gravity of the ‘non-traditional’ security threats to South-East Asian states and societies. Many of the non-traditional security issues have human security dimensions. Like non-traditional security, human security takes a broader view of the sources of threat to the well-being of states and peoples. To quote Surin Pitsuwan again, in
South-East Asia today, the so-called ‘non-traditional security issues are becoming traditional security issues. The traditional way of dealing with them is no longer adequate. All of these issues have human security dimensions. All the crises we have experienced in the last five years, while the roots may be different, all of them have human security dimensions.’ Indeed, this overlap between ‘non-traditional security’ and human security makes it easier to promote the substance, if not the exact terminology, of human security in the region.

Speaking of the impact of these crises, Surin Pitsuwan notes: ‘One good thing about the repeated crises we are having is that a sense of community is growing very fast in the region.’

This may lead to rethinking the traditional notions of sovereignty and non-interference, and a growing realization of the need for mutual help and sharing of information and resources, which may over time lead to a redefinition of sovereignty as mutual help, or what may be termed ‘mutual self-help’ as a way of promoting regional collective human security.

Indeed, some of these crises provided the context and rationale for deeper regional understanding of issues causing acute human insecurity in the region. For example, a state-centred institution focusing on economic matters, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in 1999 found it possible to discuss the East Timor crisis, with its acute human insecurity dimensions, despite initial Chinese objections. Indonesia accepted the deployment of foreign troops to manage the crisis despite its misgivings over the notion of humanitarian intervention under Australian leadership. Similarly, the aftermath of the tsunami saw Indonesia allowing major relief operations by foreign troops, including American naval forces providing humanitarian relief and assistance.

For the above reasons, the regional political climate in South-East Asia may be shifting towards greater acceptance of the

11 Personal interview, October 2005.
principles of human security. This has to do with democratic transitions (if not consolidation) in several regional polities, including Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. These South-East Asian states have joined the Republic of Korea and Taiwan in creating greater democratic space for human security concepts and approaches. Many of them support civil society groups that create greater awareness of the need for human security and the dangers of excessive concentration on national security. Some of the governments of these states have also championed the human security concept more openly as a way of distancing themselves from their authoritarian predecessors, enhancing their international legitimacy and attracting development assistance.

The foregoing discussion leads to the following observation. Traditional incidences of human insecurity, such as those captured by armed conflict indicators that form the basis of the Human Security Report, have been acute in South-East Asia. Yet they have not been sufficient in galvanizing regional official thinking into wholeheartedly embracing the concept of human security. Will it then help to gain more regional acceptance of the notion by broadening the referent objects of human insecurity to include the recent crises which have affected both freedom from fear and freedom from want (meaning they affected the region’s economic prospects as well as posing a severe threat to the well-being and safety of its peoples)? Without downplaying the importance of the armed conflict indicators or the approach taken by the Human Security Report, this author believes that a strategy of ‘localizing’ the human security concept and thereby securing it greater acceptance can benefit from such broadening, i.e. looking beyond the armed conflict indicators of human security. Hence the following sections elaborate on the human security implications of regional crises that incorporate broader referent objects of human security.
II

Human security implications of major crises in South-East Asia: 1997–2005

1 The Asian economic crisis

The Asian financial crisis started in 1997 and acutely affected four South-East Asian countries – Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (Table 2). During the worst first weeks of January 1998, the Thai baht fell by 40%, the Indonesian rupiah by 80%, the Malaysia ringgit by 40%, and the Philippine peso by 30% against the dollar from their values on 1 July 1997 (Setboonsarng, 1998). The depreciation of these currencies placed pressure on Singapore, the regional trade centre, to follow suit. Although Brunei earns petrodollars from its exports of oil and gas, and major imports of food come from ASEAN countries with devalued currencies, its currency was also devalued since it is tied to the Singapore dollar. New members of ASEAN, Viet Nam, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Myanmar – and the soon-to-be member, Cambodia – were also affected, as most of their foreign direct investments come from the older member countries of ASEAN. (Setboonsarng, 1998). In terms of capital outflow, more than $30 billion fled Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand in 1997 and 1998. Thailand was one of the countries worst hit by the crisis and it accepted a US$17.2 billion (HK$133.12 billion) rescue package from the International Monetary Fund in August 1997.12

12 Number of Asian poor set to double. http://www.geocities.com/Yosemite/7915/9811/Asia_Poverty-Dbl.html
The World Bank described the crisis as ‘the biggest setback for poverty reduction in East Asia for several decades’ (Ching, 1999). The impact on unemployment was severe. A study by the International Labour Organization (ILO) showed that between August 1997 and December 1998, unemployment in Indonesia rose from 4.3 million to 13.7 million. In Thailand, the numbers exploded from 700,000 in February 1997 to 1.9 million in December 1998, and in Malaysia from 224,000 unemployed in December 1997 to 405,000 in December 1998 (Marx, 1999). Indonesia suffered the sharpest increases in unemployment and poverty (Sussangkarn et al., 1999).

Table 2. Impact of Asian financial crisis (GDP)

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>−77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>−22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>−19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>−2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>−47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2,432</td>
<td>2,172</td>
<td>−10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The crisis toppled the Suharto regime and generated intra-regional strains – especially evident in relations between Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. The rise of Islamic political forces in Indonesia following the downfall of Suharto rekindled anxieties in Singapore about the potentially harmful impact of instability in its neighbours. Singapore’s leaders, for example, were worried that instability in Indonesia would have spill-over effects. With the downfall of Suharto, a founding figure and key anchor of South-East Asian regionalism, the crisis also cast an additional shadow over ASEAN’s future.
One of the major consequences of the Asian crisis was the focus on social and economic safety nets for the poor (Table 3). As the economist Mukul Asher points out (1999, pp. 44–45), human suffering from the crisis spurred East Asian countries to look again at the state of their respective social safety nets and to reconfirm that they can indeed achieve the goals for which they were formulated. In his view, countries must design and implement social safety nets that adequately protect individuals from an ‘abrupt and sharp fall in living standards in the event of unemployment, disability, sickness, incapacitation, or

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue discussed</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Underemployment</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation rate</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sectoral mobility</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Retranchment</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wage, real wage</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td></td>
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<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geographical mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban-rural migration</td>
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<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas/guest workers</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vulnerable, disadvantaged groups</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<tr>
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<td>√</td>
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<td>Poverty</td>
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<td>Income distribution</td>
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<td>Health</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing/shelter</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Community/family</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety net</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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Source: Paitoonpong (2000, p. 9).
retirement’. Asher argues that although East Asia managed the short-term social ramifications of the crisis more ably than was initially thought, reforms to formal social security arrangements remained essential if the objective was sustained economic growth. This was particularly salient in view of several social factors ‘typically inherent’ to economic growth and modernization. Among these factors, he stresses the likelihood of further erosion in informal community and family support systems significant to increasing individualism and broadening lifestyle choices. In addition, the relative rise in the aged population as longevity increases and birth rates decline throughout Asia anticipates increased social safety costs. These ‘simultaneous trends’ would compel governments to accept increasing responsibilities to meet these higher social safety costs. Asher notes that the mere existence of secure social safety nets would substantially reduce much of the anxiety about the future that had frustrated many in this region.

Apart from being desirable, social safety nets are also feasible. Asher argues that their realization implies much work, but as many Asian countries have existing systems that facilitate corruption, these must be eliminated before good governance can be installed. Moreover, the current environment of financial constraints and weakening government efficacy was not conducive to the success of ambitious projects. As a result, effective reform and implementation would require concerted political will and government capacity, along with increased efficiency and focus of public services. These facilitations depend on broader reforms in for example the financial sector, labour markets, the civil service and corporate governance. While these reforms would prove to be tremendous challenges to governments, specifically to their existing social safety systems, reforms are ‘indispensable’ in Asian nations wishing to provide sustainable, greater financial security and international competitiveness for their populations.
2 The SARS outbreak

The next crisis facing South-East Asia was the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), an atypical form of pneumonia with a mortality rate of around 10% that first appeared in November 2002 in Guangdong (China). Within a short time, the epidemic had a more severe impact on the regional tourism and economy than the September 11 attacks. There were a total of 8,069 cases of disease and 775 deaths, of which 350 were from mainland China. Despite taking some action to control the epidemic, China did not notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of the outbreak until February 2003, when the disease had spread rapidly, reaching nearby Hong Kong and Viet Nam in February 2003, and then to other countries via international travellers. The Chinese authorities had curbed coverage of the epidemic so as to preserve ‘face’ and public confidence. This lack of openness caused the country to take the blame for delaying the international effort against the epidemic.

The virulence of the symptoms and the infection of hospital staff alarmed global health authorities fearful of another emergent pneumonia epidemic. On 12 March 2003 WHO issued a global alert, followed by a health alert by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Local transmission of SARS took place in Toronto, Singapore, Hanoi, Taiwan, the Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Shanxi, and Hong Kong, and over 1,200 people were under quarantine in Hong Kong, 977 in Singapore and 1,147 in Taiwan.

WHO calculated the cost of SARS to the Asian region to be US$30 billion, while the Asian Development Bank assessment puts the figure at around US$60 billion (ADB, 2003). In Asia, governments and private analysts slashed their economic growth estimates for 2003 – Hong Kong was downgraded from 2.5% to 1.5%, with the cost of SARS estimated at about US$1.7 billion, Singapore from 3.5% to 2%, Malaysia from 5% to 4%, and Thailand from 4.5% to 4.3% (Richardson, 2003; FEER, 2003).
In Singapore, officials said that with the SARS crisis, air travel arrivals had dropped by half compared with the previous year to 62,500 in the first week of April. Retail sales dropped by almost 50% in the same period, and hotel room occupancy rates hovered between 10% and 20%. As the Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong observed, ‘This crisis is not just a crisis of SARS, it is also a crisis of fear – people fear catching SARS’ (FEER, 2003).

3 The Indian Ocean tsunami

Another crisis facing South-East Asia since 1997 was the tsunami disaster that devastated Asian countries in the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004. The magnitude of the earthquake was recorded as 9.15 on the Richter scale, triggering earthquakes as far away as Alaska, and killed at least 200,000 people, making it one of the deadliest disasters in modern history (Table 4). A large number of South-East Asian countries and beyond were affected, including Sri Lanka, India, the Maldives, Somalia and South Africa. Countries such as Sweden and Germany also lost over 500 citizens. Indonesia was the hardest hit – the epicentre of the earthquake that triggered the deadly waves was located off the coast of Sumatra, whose coastal regions were destroyed. At least 128,000 people died, while at least 37,000 others remain missing in Indonesia and are supposed dead. In India, more than 10,000 people lost their lives, mostly from Tamil Nadu and the Nicobar and Andaman islands. India, while refusing foreign aid for itself, provided assistance to other affected countries, especially Sri Lanka. More than 5,300 people were killed in Thailand, of which 2,200 were foreigners from 36 countries. The number of people still missing exceeds 2,800. Malaysia was shielded by Sumatra, therefore spared the widespread devastation. Nonetheless, at least 68 people were confirmed dead.

13 This section draws on Acharya (2005a).
14 Asian Survey, January/February 2005, p. 82.
The US Geological Survey estimates the toll as 283,100 killed, 14,100 missing and 1,126,900 people displaced (USGS, 2004). This is the single worst tsunami in history – the previous record was the Awa tsunami in Japan in 1703 that killed over 100,000 people (PBS, n.d.).

Although some economists believe that the damage to countries affected by the tsunami would be minor as losses in the tourism and fishing industries constituted a small percentage of their GDP (IMF, 2005; Australian, 2005), others warn that damage to infrastructure is an overriding factor. In certain areas, supplies of drinking water and farm fields may have been contaminated for years by salt water (NewScientist.com).

The tsunami helped to focus international attention on natural disasters as a threat to human security. It showed the need for Asian governments and their regional institutions to bring a human dimension to their approach to security cooperation. Dramatically, if tragically, the tsunami showed why attention to human elements of security is critical. Affluent beachgoers and tourists were not the main casualties of the tsunami. Rather, the victims were mostly poor people who lived in villages, slums and shanty-towns close to the shore. Another aspect of human

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>165 708</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1 019 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>35 399</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>654 512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>16 389</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>532 898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8 345</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>105 083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>67 007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EM-DAT (n.d.).*
insecurity that was highlighted is the disproportionately large number of children killed.

Environmental security was also an issue as areas that were protected by coral reefs and mangroves suffered less damage.

In the debate over human security, South-East Asian countries had tended to put forth ‘freedom from want’ as an alternative to the Western notion of human security as ‘freedom from fear’. But with people in poverty-stricken areas developing a new fear of natural disasters, the tsunami rendered this distinction meaningless. There is now a need to rethink human security in terms of protecting people from natural disasters.

4 Terrorism and human security

Since the first Bali bombings in October 2002, terrorism has been a major focus of South-East Asian governments. But discerning the human security implications of terrorism is problematic. While terrorism itself is a scourge of human security in its substantive sense as security of the person from mindless violence and cruelty, and anti-terrorist measures can be justified as protection for individuals as well as states, there is considerable scope for abuse in the way the discourse on terrorism is conducted and the responses to it. Moreover, responses to this challenge in Asia, as in the West, have been undertaken primarily within the framework of national security. This is true of homeland security doctrines that are now being implemented as a counter-terrorism measure. In fact, it can be argued that terrorism has refocused the attention of security discourse and policy back to national security concerns.

While governments and academic analysts spend much time talking about the need to address the ‘root causes’ of terror, which are defined in terms of poverty, inequality and injustice,

\[15\] For further discussion, see Acharya (2005b).
etc., much of the response to terrorism in the region has been to strengthen the traditional toolkit of state security: intelligence agencies, surveillance networks and counter-insurgency forces, rather than allocate resources to poverty eradication and to education and health sectors that could address these root causes. Overall, the war on terror in South-East Asia has been marked by the dominance of strategic, rather than political and humanitarian, responses.
Human security and regional cooperation

South-East Asia responded to the challenges discussed above with a mix of old and new forms of cooperation. The following sections examine the responses of regional organizations and states to recent crises.

1 The Asian economic crisis

The Asian economic crisis may have advanced the agenda of human security in two ways. The first was by challenging the time-honoured principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states. ASEAN’s norm of non-interference was given as the reason why none of the association’s partners made any effort to warn Bangkok of its evident mismanagement of the national economy. The then Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, Surin Pitsuwan, openly called for ASEAN to review its non-interference doctrine so that it could develop a capacity for ‘preventing or resolving domestic issues with regional implications’ (Straits Times Interactive, 1998). He argued: ‘it is time that ASEAN’s cherished principle of non-intervention is modified to allow it to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic issues with regional implications’. To make the grouping more effective, Surin urged that ‘when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability, a dose of peer pressure or friendly advice at the right time can be helpful’ (Bangkok Post, 1998, p. 5).

16 This section draws on Acharya (1999), pp. 1–29.
Surin’s initiative, dubbed ‘flexible engagement’, received support from just one other ASEAN member, the Philippines. ASEAN Foreign Ministers, at their annual meeting in Manila in July 1998, decided to stick to the old principle of non-interference (Strait Times Interactive, 1998).

But it was also in response to the crisis that ASEAN decided to develop cooperation on social safety nets. Social protection in ASEAN was traditionally assumed to be provided by a mix of economic growth, labour market flexibility, informal social safety nets such as support from extended families and communities, and enterprise policies such as provision of social services and long-term employment (Kawai, 2000, p. 11). Social policy issues were not discussed in the ASEAN or ASEAN+3 (Low, 2002/03, p. 34), until the second meeting of the ASEAN Senior Officials on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication held in Kuala Lumpur 29–30 October 1998 (ASEAN, 1998a). It was agreed that an ASEAN Task Force on Social Safety Nets be set up with the goal of developing and implementing an ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets to alleviate the impact of the crisis, specifically focusing on poverty issues and the development of the rural populace (ASEAN, 1998c). A ‘Hanoi Plan of Action’ was also adopted by the Sixth ASEAN Summit Meeting, 15–16 December 1998, agreeing to implement the Social Safety Nets Action Plan on an urgent basis (ASEAN, 1998b). In response to the Hanoi Plan, AusAID collaborated with ASEAN for capacity-building to implement the social safety net programmes. As part of the ASEAN-Australia Social Safety Nets project, a number of seminars were held:

- Targeting and rapid assessment for social programmes, May 2001, Indonesia;
- Social service delivery and related operational issues, August 2001, the Philippines;
- Role of national and local agencies in Social Safety Nets, November 2001, Thailand;
- Partnerships in social policy, March 2002, Malaysia.
Following these, a regional website was to be developed to provide a forum for sharing information and recommendations generated by the policy workshops, provide links to other relevant sites, and set up a discussion board for electronic dialogue. A project on Training of Facilitators on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication, which was integrated with the ASEAN-UNDP ASP6 project on Recommended Alternative Strategies for ASEAN Member Countries in Designing and Implementing Effective Social Safety Nets Programs, was implemented in June 2001 in Indonesia (ASEAN, 2002a).

2 The SARS outbreak

Among regional institutions, ASEAN led the way in responding to the SARS outbreak (BusinessWorld, 2004). An ASEAN+3 Ministers of Health Special Meeting on SARS was held in Kuala Lumpur on 26 April 2003, followed on 29 April by an emergency Special ASEAN-China (plus Hong Kong) Leaders Meeting initiated by Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and attended by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, joined by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Tung Chee-Hwa.

This meeting discussed regional mechanisms to detect and respond quickly to pandemics, including installation of surveillance systems. It agreed on a common strategy to combat SARS, putting in place a series of coordinated measures to keep borders open while ensuring that the scourge would be contained. Apart from urging greater understanding of the nature of the virus and its transmission, they pledged to set up a network to share information on SARS and have standardized health declaration cards and temperature checks for air passengers. Thus an ASEAN citizen would not be denied entry to another ASEAN country on suspicion of SARS, but given access to medical assistance. To be sure, some ASEAN countries that did not have a SARS problem were reluctant to impose health screening measures. But they were eventually persuaded on the grounds
that without such measures an ASEAN containment strategy would be jeopardized.

Other measures included information-sharing on SARS, contact tracing and follow-up procedures. A hotline was set up among the health ministers and their senior officials to facilitate communication in emergencies; and ASEAN and the China and Hong Kong health authorities were in constant contact. They also adopted an 'isolate and contain' strategy to ensure that those not affected by SARS were able to travel smoothly within South-East Asia.

A flurry of meetings followed over the next six months, demonstrating the degree to which South-East Asian governments cooperated against SARS. A Special ASEAN+3 Senior Labour Officials Meeting (SLOM) on SARS was convened in July 2003 in Manila to discuss the impact of SARS on labour, employment, human resources and occupational safety and health, including the role of the social partners in easing the impact on retrenchments, unemployment and workers’ protection. Representatives from WHO, ILO and ADB were also present and provided updates on their respective measures to control SARS and its impact on the region. At the May 2003 ASEAN+3 Aviation Forum on the Prevention and Containment of SARS in the Philippines, participants agreed to undertake measures for the screening of departing and arriving passengers and standardized health declaration cards. The ASEAN+3 countries and their partners took the lead in drafting the common resolution on SARS adopted by the 56th World Health Assembly at its May 2003 session in Geneva. And in June 2003, China and ASEAN worked out the Entry-Exit Quarantine Action Plan for Controlling the Spread of SARS.

Two months from the outbreak, the health ministers declared South-East Asia a SARS-free region, free of local transmission, the last case being isolated on 11 May 2003. They urged countries that had issued travel advisories to South-East Asia to withdraw them, pledging to continue their prevention
and control measures and to maintain full vigilance. Looking ahead, the ministers adopted a Framework ASEAN+3 Action Plan on Prevention and Control of SARS and other Infectious Diseases with the overall objective of building the region’s capability to respond to future outbreaks like SARS. The Action Plan has four priority areas: guidelines for international travel; ASEAN SARS Containment Information Network; capacity-building for the region to respond to future outbreaks of new and emerging diseases; public education.

By mid-June, South-East Asian countries were planning preventive measures against future outbreaks. In June 2003 Malaysia hosted the WHO Global Conference on SARS in Kuala Lumpur to review the epidemiological, clinical management and laboratory findings on SARS, and discuss global control strategies. When SARS had receded in November 2003, ASEAN+3 launched a new hotline as part of a plan to control communicable diseases in the region – designed to halt the spread of new epidemics and prevent the return of SARS. The meeting agreed to develop Thailand as a centre for the monitoring of epidemics, with each country establishing central information centres that would be linked by the hotline.

The success of these urgently arranged meetings can be attributed to the strong shared economic interest among ASEAN countries to eradicate SARS. The crisis highlighted regional interdependence and common vulnerabilities. Shortcomings notwithstanding, South-East Asia with its established mechanisms of dialogue partnerships does provide a framework for discussing and addressing transnational threats. These efforts helped the region to bounce back quickly from the epidemic, with its economy recovering to a healthy 5% GDP growth in 2003, compared with 4.5% in 2002, riding on a strong second half of the year.
The Indian Ocean tsunami

The tsunami disaster triggered an enormous and overwhelming outpouring of aid from international public and private sources. The Bush administration pledged an initial US$15 million, later increased to US$350 million. The Pentagon’s aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and eleven other warships carrying supplies, helicopters and troops were deployed to the western Sumatran coast to provide relief. An additional 1,500 US Marines headed for Sri Lanka (Elliott, 2005). The European Union pledged US$578 million. Australia contributed an upfront US$45 million, and a US$750 million Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD) programme – a five-year commitment of US$375 million in grants and US$375 million in concession loans over forty years – the largest single aid package in Australia’s history. This will be in addition to Australia’s ongoing Development Cooperation Program and Defence Cooperation Program, bringing the provision of aid to Indonesia to a total of about US$1.5 billion over the next five years (AusAID, 2004). Germany pledged US$660 million, Japan US$500 million, Canada US$354 million, India US$183 million, Norway US$175 million, Italy US$91 million, Denmark US$74 million, China US$63 million, and the World Bank offered US$250 million. In all, about US$13 billion was pledged in aid around the world. The United Nations has estimated that reconstruction work across the whole affected region will take about five years, and could cost US$9 billion.

While the role of non-Asian actors such as the European Union and the United States in providing disaster assistance has been and remains critical, one important aspect of tsunami aid that stands out is the special contribution of some Asian countries: Japan, India, China and Singapore. Japan’s half-billion dollar disaster aid package is the highest offered by any country. China’s US$63 million may seem insignificant by comparison.
The tsunami may move China more to enhance its capacity for international disaster assistance in order to keep up with the United States and other major powers. India, itself a victim, has offered some US$22.5 million in aid to Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand and Indonesia. Singapore’s role also stood out; the tsunami has seen the Republic mount its most elaborate humanitarian assistance effort, involving its military and civil defence elements. Along with the generous assistance provided by Malaysia, it signifies the emergence of newly developed smaller Asian countries in providing material assistance to their neighbours hit by tragedy.

While the main relief efforts came from countries outside the region, such as Australia, China, India, Japan and the United States, South-East Asia contributed whatever they could. Malaysia deployed a 250-man police contingent to Aceh and planned employment assistance for Indonesians affected by the tsunami, as well as providing engineering expertise in areas designated by Indonesia as requiring assistance. Singapore donated US$30 million from government and private donations and was also one of the first to send a 900-strong contingent to Aceh, deploying aircraft, landing ships and helicopters as well as opening its air and naval facilities to all countries helping in the massive relief and reconstruction effort. Brunei donated US$150,000 for tsunami relief to Indonesia. Thailand, which had been badly hit by the tsunami with the loss of over 5,000 lives, many of whom were foreign tourists, had politely declined a Japanese offer for financial assistance worth US$20 million and instead recommended that it be sent to those countries Tokyo deemed needier. Cash-strapped countries such as the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Philippines provided token assistance in the form of cash donations or the deployment of medical missions. The Lao PDR raised US$55,000 for countries hit by the tsunami while the Philippines sent medical missions that had the added task of locating Filipino victims (ASEAN, 2005).
In January 2005, a Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in Jakarta discussed coordination of international relief efforts and the creation of a regional early warning system. ASEAN’s proposed Resolution on ‘Strengthening Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on Aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster’ was adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly on 19 January 2005. This would establish and utilize military and civilian personnel in disaster relief operation, an ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre, and the ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network. This was followed by the Phuket Ministerial Declaration on Regional Cooperation on Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements in Thailand on 29 January 2005. At this meeting, expertise was contributed in the Pacific region through the International Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific (ITSU) coordinated by UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the Tropical Cyclones Centre of Reunion Island and the European meteorological satellite ‘Meteosat’, as well as the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) under the Intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations. Immediate steps were taken to enhance early warning capabilities in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia and to establish interim warning arrangements and the strengthening and upgrading of national systems, while moving towards a coordinated regional system. Networking through the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and the Indian Ocean Commission to upgrade knowledge and capacities and share best practices, the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre (ASMC) and the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre, the Indian Global Ocean Observing System – all developed within the UN’s international strategy coordinated by the IOC.

The most important proactive measure adopted by ASEAN has been the creation of a Regional Tsunami Early Warning Centre in Thailand. But cooperation with international agencies has been the main thrust of ASEAN’s approach to
disaster management. Thus, in April 2005, the United Nations Development Programme officially opened its ASEAN regional centre for coordinating disaster preparedness, with the tasks of coordinating and supporting responses region-wide in partnership with UN agencies and NGOs in disaster preparedness and mitigation work, together with conducting assessments when disasters strike.

There have been other forms of regional and international cooperation in response to the tsunami. These include APEC’s decision to establish a Virtual Task Force for Emergency Preparedness in March 2005. The Virtual Task Force would strengthen coordination efforts among APEC Member Economies in relation to disaster relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in disaster-stricken areas (APEC, 2005). Moreover, in June 2005, APEC, partnering the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), sponsored a workshop in Honolulu to share resources, experiences and technologies with affected economies. Its key objectives are to provide an overview of the All Hazards Early Warning System with special emphasis on inter-operability among the national systems currently being developed in tsunami-affected countries, showcase best practices and case studies and share tools, science and system integration in all hazards risk reduction from the US and Asia-Pacific, while promoting capacity-building for an effective response to a range of natural and man-made disasters and emergencies.

The tsunami underscored the need to rethink the role of Asian states in humanitarian action. It highlighted the absence of regional mechanisms, whether tsunami early warning systems or standby arrangements to provide rapid response to humanitarian disasters. It clearly showed the need for the region to develop new and more focused mechanisms to deal with humanitarian

17 Asia Pacific All Hazards Workshop, 6–10 June 2005, Honolulu. http://www.apec.org/content/apec/asia_pacific_all_hazards.html

45
emergencies. The regional Tsunami Warning System is one such initiative. But regional organizations, in cooperation with international agencies, must also acquire expertise in disaster prevention and management. There is an urgent need for a regional coordination centre for humanitarian aid. Some have suggested the creation of a regional disaster assistance force, but more practically, Asian states could undertake training towards greater coordination of relief efforts, including earmarking and joint training of civilian and military resources before disaster strikes. A regional disaster management fund – the natural disaster equivalent of the proposed Asian regional monetary fund – could also be explored. And civil society in Asia should develop mechanisms and institutions for transnational humanitarian assistance. Regional governments could encourage the role of such institutions by subsidizing and supporting them.
Conclusions and policy recommendations

The concept of human security confronts the policy community in South-East Asia with several challenges. The first is to address scepticism about the need for this concept in view of earlier and ongoing attempts in the region at redefining security and giving it a broader meaning. The second stems from the divergence between South-East Asia and the West in understanding what human security actually means, and what sort of issues it should cover. A third is how to introduce the concept into policy debates and approaches.

Some analysts and policy-makers in South-East Asia argue that the region does not need a concept of human security because, in this part of the world, attempts to redefine and broaden the concept of human security are nothing new (Acharya, 2004a). After all, what is known in Asian academic and policy circles as ‘comprehensive security’ was articulated in Japan and South-East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. But comprehensive security, while paying attention to economic development and social stability, was not really focused on the ‘security of the human person’. In the case of Japan, it was used to legitimize higher defence spending beyond what was mandated by its peace constitution. In Singapore, it served the country’s defence mobilization needs, being part of its ‘Total Defence’ strategy. In South-East Asia, associated notions of comprehensive security such as national and regional ‘resilience’ coined by the Suharto regime in Indonesia and adopted as a general ideology by the members of ASEAN, became an integral aspect of the strategy of regime preservation. In short, although the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ predated that of human security,
comprehensive security focused strongly on regime legitimation and identifying and addressing non-military threats to state security. It was not people-centred per se.

Hence, the concept of human security that underscores the centrality of human dignity and does not put the interests of the state or the society above that of the individual or the ‘self’ constitutes a distinctive approach compared with earlier attempts at redefining security in the region.

The concept of human security reflects new forces and trends in international relations. Globalization ensures that the national security of states can be challenged by forces other than foreign armies, including forces that endanger lives while leaving the physical boundaries of states intact. Governments can no longer survive, much less achieve legitimacy, by citing their performance through rates of economic growth or social and political stability and by providing for defence against external military threats. Democratization empowers new actors, such as civil society, which must be accounted for in the security framework. Human security in this sense reflects real world developments that could not be captured by the narrow and military-focused idea of national security.

This leads to the issue of differing interpretations of what the concept means. The main differences in understanding and application of human security are between those who associate it with reducing human costs of conflict and violence, as was the case with the earlier formulations by the Canadian Government, and those who take a broader view, including issues of economic development and well-being. This broader view seems more popular among Asian governments, such as Japan, although the UNDP also advocated a broader view of human security. Some people see debates about the meaning and interpretation of human security as an unwelcome distraction from policy advocacy and action. But such debates are necessary, because policy formulation to promote human security is closely associated with the way the concept is defined and put into operation.
Promoting human security suffers from a deficiency of educational toolkits and resources. Despite the proliferation of literature on security studies, the number of texts that can be used to teach courses and seminars on human security remains extremely few. Security studies in South-East Asia are still essentially wedded to the notion of national security, although recent initiatives, such as the Ford Foundation supported Non-Traditional Security Issues in Asia project,\(^\text{18}\) have contributed to greater awareness and literature on human security issues. But there is enormous scope for innovation. It will be really interesting to have a text that takes human security as its central organizing framework around which other elements of security, including military balances, weapons of mass destruction and economic development, could be framed. The teaching of human security also calls for greater reliance on case studies, including micro-studies of conflict and poverty zones around the world, which are not readily available in mainstream undergraduate textbooks on international relations and security studies. It challenges us to develop a more transnational teaching community that includes those with more hands-on experience, including experience with international organizations and the NGO community.

The key normative issue for the promotion of human security in South-East Asia of course concerns the non-interference principle. A cherished norm of ASEAN, non-interference has been under challenge since the Asian economic crisis in 1997. More recently, ASEAN’s willingness to discuss the domestic political situation in Myanmar attests to further pressure on the norm. The transnational dangers facing the region have done much to dilute the norm, but more debate and discussion is needed to institutionalize new policies in support of human security that might require relaxation of the strict interpretation of non-interference.

\(^{18}\) For details of this project, see Emmers et al. (2006).
There are several issues to take into consideration when discussing the promotion of human security in policy discourse as well as in educational institutions.

First, any concept of human security, in order to be acceptable to South-East Asia, must combine 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. The debate about which concept is the more important and relevant is becoming sterile and unhelpful. Human security is what states and peoples make it and attempting to impose arbitrary limits or boundary markers on its scope is bound to be futile. What is more important is to view these divergent understandings not as mutually exclusive, but as complementary parts of a total package. Each is inadequate in the absence of the other. Some well-meaning advocates of human security want to focus on a narrower definition that excludes freedom from want and downgrades the focus on reducing wartime human suffering. While this approach may have the virtue of making the concept more precise and hence more 'measurable', it is also divorced from reality. To speak of human security in Asia, where poverty and authoritarianism remain pervasive maladies, without bringing in the question of political rights and economic vulnerabilities, is to severely undermine the utility of the concept in moving the region away from the traditional understanding of security and devising policy tools to institutionalize the new understanding at national and regional levels.

Second, it is important to recognize, as has been done by the report of the Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (CHS, 2003), that the state remains an indispensable aspect of human security. While national security is about protection of the state (its sovereignty and territorial integrity), human security is about protecting the people. But what does protecting the people actually mean? On the surface, there should be no contradiction between security of the state and security of the people; a strong state with resources and policy apparatus is needed to ensure the protection of the people. In fact,
the report of the Commission on Human Security seems to acknowledge this point when it states that 'Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development.' But whether state security and human security conflict with each other depends very much on the nature of the government. In many developing countries, as well as in some Western countries in the wake of September 11, human security as security for the people can and does get threatened by actions of their own governments. As *Human Security Now* says: 'The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security obligations – and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people.' Any link between human security and national security should be contingent on the nature of the government.

To fully address the conditions and threats that people face, the focus in human security must shift from looking at 'what' to promote to 'how' this should be promoted. The 'what to promote' remains definitional. The Commission on Human Security report of 2003 focuses on which human elements of security, rights or development to strengthen. There is relative silence on modes of achieving progress in advancing human security. The development of normative frameworks, and 'translating them into concrete policies and actions' is mooted, but the actors and catalysts that will be the agents of change are not explored (CHS, 2003, p. 26). In other words, there is now a need to shift attention from measurement of human security to promotion of human security measures.

In South-East Asia, much of the discourse on human security remains couched in capacity-building and empowerment terms. As in *Human Security Now*, there is also a broad consensus among those conversant in human security language that this concept should be mainstreamed in the work of global, regional and national security organizations. The prioritized targets for this new conception of security are identified as groups involved in violent conflicts. Two examples of resources already devoted to
promoting human security are the UN Trust Fund for Human Security and the bilateral Grassroots Human Security Grants, both established by the government of Japan. Japan has set aside more than US$200 million to the UN Trust Fund, and also contributed about US$120 million in fiscal year 2003 for bilateral grants to further human security. The destination of these funds is mainly local communities and NGOs working in developing countries. 19 The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is also involved in spearheading programmes to promote human security. The technical cooperation programmes, equipment provision schemes, emergency disaster relief teams and community empowerment programmes are designed to further human security by targeting people at grass-roots level in developing countries for the betterment of their livelihood and welfare. In 1999 alone, Japan’s total overseas development assistance amounted to US$15.385 billion (JICA, n.d.). JICA has also incorporated the Millennium Development Goals that are grounded in human security into their operations in country and sector programmes (JICA, 2003). Canada has also undertaken a major human security programme, both domestically and externally.

Regional governments in South-East Asia have yet to develop a consensus on the adoption of human security into their multilateral agenda and agree on specific measures to promote the idea. It is clear that, until now, regional cooperation on human security in Asia focuses primarily on economic rather than political challenges. As at the national level, ‘freedom from want’ has taken precedence over ‘freedom from fear’ in the development of regional cooperation to promote human security. Hence there is no Asian or ASEAN mechanism for human rights protection, despite the development of a dialogue to create such a mechanism within ASEAN. ASEAN countries have also not taken up the

issue of small arms, child soldiers, landmines ban and other aspects of human security that conform to the Western definitions of the concept. Instead, whatever cooperation that exists addresses managing the adverse consequences of the Asian economic crisis. ASEAN’s response here involves restructuring institutional mechanisms for ASEAN social development cooperation and the creation of several human resource programmes, for example the ASEAN Occupational Safety and Health Network, which attempts to promote human security through standardizing the guidelines for workplace safety.

The role of civil society organizations in the promotion of human security deserves attention, especially because they address human insecurity both in terms of ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. Among the South-East Asian NGOs who have been particularly active in promoting freedom from fear at regional level is Forum-Asia, the largest and most prominent transnational NGO in the region. This group seeks to ‘facilitate collaboration among human rights organizations in the region so as to develop a regional response on issues of common concern’ (Forum Asia, n.d.). Activities include monitoring and reporting on human rights violations, conducting human rights educational activities, and organizing fact-finding missions and trial observations (Forum Asia, 2000; 2001). The Bangkok-based Focus on the Global South, along with Malaysia-based Third World Network, has been at the forefront of campaigns to create greater awareness of the dangers to ‘freedom from want’, especially those posed by globalization, and has organized protests against the exploitation of labour and environment by multinationals. A variety of other NGOs operating at national and regional levels have addressed more specific needs that may be considered as part of a human security framework. The call for human security, espoused both by Western countries and Japan, which entails recognition of threats to the safety and dignity of the individual, provides a conceptual justification for closer involvement of civil society and social movements in regional
cooperation that had traditionally been the exclusive preserve of governments. In general, however, governments in Asia have been reticent about cooperating with NGOs in promoting human security. And human security cooperation remains subject to the state-centric norms of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

This report proposes the following additional recommendations as a way of promoting human security in South-East Asia:

First, the concept of non-traditional security or human security can provide a useful conceptual basis for refocusing. These concepts recast security as security for the people (as opposed to states or governments) and pay attention to non-military threats to survival and well-being of societies including poverty, environmental degradation and disease, which are linked to both human and natural forces. Regional think tanks should find ways of reconciling the concepts of comprehensive and non-traditional security, which have already found broad acceptance in the region, with the concept of human security.

Research on human security issues by think tanks such as ASEAN-ISIS and universities should be supplemented by dissemination and educational strategies. A regional council of educators at both secondary school and university levels could work with national bodies in ASEAN member states to develop curricula and teaching materials on human security issues, including trends in conflict and violence in regional conflict zones, the scale of human misery caused by poverty, economic underdevelopment and inequality in the region, and the danger posed by transnational challenges such as pandemics, natural disasters and environmental degradation. Think tanks should also consider issuing an annual State of Human Security in South-East Asia, a venture that should attract support from foreign donor agencies.

Second, the countries of the region, and the regional organization ASEAN, should embrace the ‘humanitarian
assistance’ (if not humanitarian intervention, which has proved too controversial in the region) through statements and declarations in much the same way as comprehensive security has become an integral part of ASEAN security literature and discourse. The ASEAN Charter, which is now being developed by a group of eminent persons appointed by ASEAN leaders, could be an important vehicle for enshrining the concept of human security as a basic normative framework for ASEAN. Until now, South-East Asia has resisted the concept of humanitarian intervention, which has been adopted by Western and even African regional groupings. Yet humanitarian assistance and cooperative action in coping with complex emergencies can serve as a new rallying point for Asian regional groups and to some extent offset their resistance to the political notion of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian assistance offers a less contentious and accurate way of describing the response to human security challenges. Countries should ensure greater transparency and information-sharing on challenges to human security. This involves early warning of natural disasters, pandemics, terrorist movements and financial volatility. Some mechanisms for transparency are already evolving. One example is the peer-review mechanism set up by ASEAN after the economic crisis. Another example is the ongoing effort to develop an early warning system for tsunamis in the Indian Ocean.

During the discussion at the ASEAN-UNESCO Concept Workshop on Human Security in Southeast Asia (Jakarta, 26–27 October 2006), the following points emerged concerning the role of ASEAN in promoting human security.

• ASEAN has already undertaken several initiatives that speak to a broader notion of human security. Examples cited include recent agreements of disaster management and relief, or plans to make ASEAN a drug-free region by 2015. The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime addresses certain threats to human security, such as illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in
persons, arms smuggling, terrorism and various forms of economic crime. The ASEAN Action Plan on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication addresses economic threats to human security.

• ASEAN will do well to harmonize its 'comprehensive security' approach with the broader concept of human security (freedom from want) now prevailing at international level.

• At this stage, it would be unrealistic to expect ASEAN to embrace the notion of human security formally through its charter or institutional mechanisms. For example, the ASEAN Charter will not mention the term 'human security', although it may be possible to include references to respect for international humanitarian law by member states. It is more feasible politically for ASEAN to take a 'human development' approach to human security, rather than the Canadian formulation which focuses on freedom from fear. The latter approach is not feasible at this juncture, at least through the ASEAN mechanism. ‘The personal level of human security – when we talk about human rights, human dignity, and spirituality – that I am afraid is still the domain of national governments.’

• While human security is not the same as state security – on this point, there was consensus – national security and human security are complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. States would have the ‘primary responsibility’ in promoting human security, both at national level and through regional and international cooperation.

• ASEAN is unlikely to adopt the principle of humanitarian intervention, or ‘responsibility to protect’ being promoted by Canada and other Western nations. Instead of seeking exceptions to non-interference, which is politically sensitive, it may be better to use the phrase, as one participant suggested, ‘mutual support in times of crisis’, which is ‘perfectly acceptable to all, and is already on the ground’.
On this basis, other suggestions could be made as follows:

The ASEAN Secretariat could compile a list of various ASEAN agreements and declarations that speak to the broader notion of human security. This would be consistent with the claims made by several ASEAN participants at the 2006 Concept Workshop that while ASEAN has not formally adopted human security as a goal (at least the term itself), it has already taken measures on the ground to address human security problems in the region, including those posed by regional crises.

ASEAN should also work in cooperation with other Asian and Asia-Pacific regional organizations to promote human security. Until recently, these groups remained focused on such traditional agendas as trade liberalization or addressing traditional security issues, including inter-state tensions. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia’s only security organization, focused primarily on measures such as confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. More recently, ARF and APEC have turned their attention to fighting terrorism. APEC, ARF and ASEAN have now increasingly turned their attention to non-traditional and human security issues. This is a welcome shift that needs to be further encouraged and strengthened with new institutional mechanisms.

Regional organizations such as APEC, ARF, ASEAN and ADB can cooperatively play an important role in human security promotion. APEC has three pillars, of which economic and technical cooperation could be structured to advance human security (APEC, n.d.). Some of its relevant working groups and committees that could promote institutional arrangements to promote human security include the Senior Officials Meeting Committee on Economic and Technical Cooperation, the Beijing Initiative on Human Capacity Building, the APEC Food System (which includes elements of Rural Infrastructural Development), the Gender Focal Point Network, and the Sustainable Development Working Group.
Some of the ASEAN and ARF dialogues and programmes could also be specified to promote human security. Recent activities such as the Seminar on Economic Security for Asia-Pacific in the First Decades of the 21st Century (February 2002), the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Seminar (December 2002), the Workshop on Changing Security Perception of the ARF Countries and the ARF Security Policy Conference (November 2004) seek to draft frameworks to advance human security (ASEAN, 2002b; 2003; 2004). ASEAN could designate its Social Development Unit as a Human Security Unit to further advance the idea of human security through concrete measures.

A coordinating mechanism among these various regional bodies could be a useful device for implementing measures consistent with the promotion of human security in the region.

The creation of new institutions to support human security could be a third area of policy action. An educational response could be a committee to promote human security studies in the academic curricula of schools and universities. At the political level, ASEAN countries should consider setting up an ASEAN Human Security Council, comprising eminent persons, experts and members of NGOs. The task of the AHSC would be: to identify and study challenges to human security in the region, consider appropriate coping mechanisms and recommend both preventive and reactive measures to governments. Moreover, the AHSC should form a Legal Committee on Human Security whose main function would be to review the participation of member states in all relevant international treaties that impinge upon the notion of human security, such as human rights treaties and conventions on small arms and light weapons.

Last but not least, coordinating mechanisms for response to humanitarian crises should be developed by Asia, including South-East Asia. Asia is a diverse continent and the
interests and capacities of states to provide humanitarian aid vary widely, depending on levels of economic development and civilian and military logistical and personnel capabilities. But a number of Asian countries increasingly have the resources and capabilities to undertake significant humanitarian action, hence it is timely to examine their interests and capabilities for humanitarian action, not just at the national level but also in cooperation with the UN and within the framework of regional agencies. To this end, ASEAN could convene an international workshop to examine the threat to national and human security posed by complex humanitarian emergencies in the region; the experience and policy framework of states in undertaking humanitarian action; national capabilities for humanitarian action and the sharing of best practices; modalities of cooperation between UN agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and national governments; and how existing and new regional mechanisms for humanitarian action could work better together in cooperation with UN agencies.
Tables

1 GDP per capita (PPP US$)

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## Human Development Indicators

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*Source: UNDP (2001; 2003; 2004; 2005a).*
3 Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP

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[ ] = SIPRI estimate

## 4 Military expenditure US$ millions (2000 constant prices)

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[ ] = SIPRI estimate

Source: SIPRI (2005)
5 Military and social expenditures in South-East Asia as percentage of GDP

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[ ] = SIPRI estimate

Sources:
- c. UNDP (2005a).
- d. World Bank Education Statistics Database.
- e. UNDP (2005a).
6 Selected anti-terrorism measures involving South-East Asian countries

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Measure/Text</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<td>ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism</td>
<td>1 August 2002</td>
<td>¾ framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building</td>
<td>¾ provides a framework to cooperate in disrupting terrorism ¾ share intelligence ¾ joint operations ¾ block terrorist access to funds ¾ regular meetings to monitor compliance at ministerial level</td>
<td>No reference to US deployments (obstructions from Indonesia and Vietnam), which got the agreement to recognize &quot;the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states&quot; (the guiding principles of ASEAN diplomacy) Non-binding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>5 November 2001</td>
<td>[&quot;acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed whenever and by whomever, as a profound threat to international peace and security which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world&quot;]</td>
<td>[&quot;acknowledge link between poverty and terrorism ¾ improve national mechanisms to fight terrorism ¾ notification of all anti-terrorist conventions ¾ more cooperation among law agencies ¾ better exchange of information&quot;</td>
<td>Symbolic gesture as the question of implementation was not discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing</td>
<td>ARF members</td>
<td>30 July 2002</td>
<td>&quot;we will address ways and means to cooperate together in the fight against terrorism&quot;</td>
<td>freezing terrorist assets, implementation of international standards, international cooperation on the exchange of information and outreach, technical assistance, compliance and reporting, formation of an Inter-Sessional Group (ISG) on counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime (co-chaired by Malaysia and US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism</td>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>20–21 May 2002</td>
<td>&quot;unanimously condemn acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and endorse the urgency for a cohesive and united approach to effectively combat terrorism&quot;</td>
<td>meeting for ministers of the interior and home affairs, a series of concrete measures with a series of projects by member states, training by Malaysia on intelligence, by Singapore on bomb detection, by Indonesia with a workshop on terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Programme on Terrorism to implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime</td>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>17 May 2002</td>
<td>share information, disseminate information on the relevant laws, bilateral, international treaties on terrorism, enhance cooperation between ASEAN and specialized organizations (such as ASEANPOL), ratify anti-terrorism conventions, combat terrorism, and anti-terrorism</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Adopted at an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tripartite anti-terrorism pact</td>
<td>Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines</td>
<td>7 May 2002</td>
<td>“We formalized formal contacts in one umbrella agreement to cover quite a number of areas of cooperation, not only in the area of terrorism proper, but also expanding it into piracy as well as money laundering.”</td>
<td>- anti-terrorism exercises as well as combined operations to hunt suspected terrorists, the setting up of hotlines and sharing of airline passenger lists - armed at speeding intelligence exchanges between the three neighbours</td>
</tr>
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| APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-terrorism | APEC | 21 October 2001 | “Leaders deem it imperative to strengthen international cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that UN should play a major role in this regard, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions.” | - cooperation in enhancing security at customs, limiting the fallout from terrorist attacks - enhance ports, aircraft and aviation security - strengthening APEC activities in the area of critical sector protection, including telecommunications, transportation, health and energy | |

Notes

a. ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 1 August 2002.
b. ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 5 November 2001.
c. ARF chairman’s statement is available at http://www.asiansec.org/ammyргар/1.htm
d. Joint communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 20–21 May 2002.
Acknowledgements

The author is deeply grateful to Tan Kwoh Jack for research assistance in preparing this study.
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http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18237.htm

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/


Appendices
Mr Amitav Acharya’s brief biography

Amitav Acharya is professor of international affairs at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Prior to this, he was deputy director and head of research of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. His previous appointments include professor of political science at York University, Toronto, fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center, and senior fellow of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Center for Business and Government.


Prof. Acharya is a member of the editorial board of *Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs, European Journal of International Relations,*

He is also a regular writer and commentator on key developments in international public affairs. His public interest books include The Age of Fear: Power Versus Principle in the War on Terror (Rupa and Co./Marshall Cavendish, 2004) and Can Asia Lead? Rivalry and Cooperation in a Region Ascendant (World Scientific, 2007). His international media appearances include interviews with CNN, BBC World Service, CNBC and Channel News Asia (Singapore). His recent op-eds have appeared in Financial Times, International Herald Tribune, Straits Times, Far Eastern Economic Review, Japan Times and Yale Global Online, covering such topics as Asian security, regional cooperation, human security, the war on terror, and the rise of China and India.
Final Recommendations

First International Meeting of Directors
of Peace Research and Training Institutions
on the theme
What Agenda for Human Security
in the Twenty-first Century?*

1. Human security can be considered today as a paradigm in the making, for ensuring both a better knowledge of the rapidly evolving large-scale risks and threats that can have a major impact on individuals and populations, and a strengthened mobilization of the wide array of actors actually involved in participative policy formulation in the various fields it encompasses today.

As such, it is an adequate framework for:

- accelerating the transition from past restrictive notions of security, tending to identify it solely with defence issues, to a much more comprehensive multidimensional concept of security, based on the respect for all human rights and democratic principles;
- contributing to sustainable development and especially to the eradication of extreme poverty, which is a denial of all human rights;
- reinforcing the prevention at the root of the different forms of violence, discrimination, conflict and internal strife that are taking a heavy toll on mainly civilian populations in all regions of the world without exception;
- providing a unifying theme for multilateral action to the benefit of the populations most affected by partial and
interrelated insecurities. The importance should be underlined of the multilateral initiatives taken in this respect by Canada and Japan as well as by other countries.

2. The ongoing globalization process offers new opportunities for the strengthening of large coalitions working to further human security, at the multilateral and national levels, and in particular at local level involving all actors of society. This in turn requires a much stronger participation of peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other bodies dedicated to the promotion of peace and human security, with a view to enhancing the involvement of civil society in all aspects of policy formulation and implementation of actions aimed at enhancing human security at the local, national, regional and international levels.

3. The promotion of human security today therefore requires an enhanced exchange of best experiences, practices and initiatives in the fields of research, training, mobilization and policy formulation, in which UNESCO can play a major role as a facilitator, forum and amplifier of proactive human security initiatives, in particular in the framework of the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum website launched in September 2000 for that purpose (http://www.unesco.org/securipax).

4. The strengthening of the action of the United Nations and, in particular, of UNESCO in favour of human security is essential today, taking into account the objectives set out in the UN Millennium Summit Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, and the Declaration and Plan for an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly, as well as on the measures being taken to reach internationally agreed development targets, in particular in the fields of poverty eradication; education for all;
the preservation of the environment and notably of water resources; and the struggle against AIDS.

5. The compounded impact of a growing number of threats to the security of populations requires the establishment of innovative interdisciplinary approaches geared to the requirements of inducing participative preventive action, involving all social actors. The intimate links that should exist between research projects and policy formulation in the field of prevention must also be stressed from the outset, taking into account the fact that current research on various dimensions of security is still largely dissociated from the existing policy formulation mechanisms, particularly at the national and subregional levels. On the basis of a common agenda for action, the peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies and the NGOs working in related fields can play an essential role in creating these links, building bridges between the academic world and the policy formulation mechanisms, contributing to the establishment of such mechanisms wherever necessary, identifying priority fields to be tackled and the populations that merit particular and urgent attention.

6. Regional and subregional approaches should be elaborated for the promotion of human security in order to more precisely identify the nature, scope and impact of the risks and threats that can affect populations in the medium and long term. UNESCO should contribute to the elaboration of these regional and subregional approaches, in cooperation with national and regional organizations and institutions and on the basis of the regional round tables (on Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean) held during the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions. Urgent attention should be paid to the reinforcement of the struggle against AIDS, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which is a real threat to peace and security, as stated by the United Nations Security Council.

7. Special attention should be paid to the most highly populated countries, given the fact that in these countries the
interrelationship between population growth, diminishing natural resources, environmental degradation and the overall impact of ongoing globalization processes is of great complexity and must consequently be dealt with, in particular in terms of designing local approaches focusing on specific population groups.

8. The development of human resources is a key factor, if not the most important, for ensuring human security. Basic education for all and the building of capacities at the national level must therefore be placed high on the human security agenda. Institutes for peace and human security can play an important role in national capacity building in fields such as the setting up of early-warning mechanisms related to major risks and threats to human security; and high-level training for the elaboration of regional and subregional long-term approaches for ensuring human security and the formulation of preventive action policies.

9. Critical post-conflict issues such as reconciliation processes and mechanisms and the often harsh impact of sanctions on populations merit more in-depth analysis in terms of human security, in the framework of an enhanced respect for international instruments, in particular of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concerning reconciliation processes and mechanisms, due attention should be paid to the adequate dissemination of best experiences and practices and to the comparative analysis of these experiences and practices, especially of the work of the various truth and justice commissions set up in last two decades in various countries. Concerning the impact of sanctions on populations, note should be taken of ongoing initiatives within the United Nations in order to review the modalities of the imposition of such sanctions and the action of UN Specialized Agencies to alleviate their impact on civilian populations.

10. The impact on human security of migrations and of movements of populations displaced due to conflict should be
highlighted. Concerning migrations, attention should be paid to countering practices in host countries that discriminate against legal immigrants, and in the case of populations displaced due to conflict, the efforts of the international community should be reinforced, especially when the displacements take on a semi-permanent character.

11. Due attention should be paid to countering the impact of negative paradigms (such as 'clash of civilizations', 'African anarchy', etc.), based on stereotypes and simplistic analyses of the interactions between cultures, societies and civilizations and which aim at fostering new divisions and fractures at the international and regional levels. The principles underlying the notions of cultural diversity, cultural pluralism, tolerance and non-discrimination should be stressed and due attention should be paid to the follow-up to the Plan of Action of the World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban, South Africa, 2001).

12. The role of the state in the promotion of human security must be addressed on the basis of an exhaustive analysis of challenges in matters relating to human security, both from within to ensure sustainable development, and from the rapidly evolving international processes linked to economic and financial globalization. States should be encouraged to establish ways of enlarging their cooperation with civil society, in particular with those NGOs and institutions that can contribute effectively to policy formulation and collaborative action in the field.
Some UNESCO publications on Human Security, Peace and Conflict Prevention

http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001511/151145E.pdf

http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001511/151144E.pdf

In English: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001493/149376E.pdf

*Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in the Arab States*, UNESCO, 2005
In English: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140513E.pdf

*Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Latin America and the Caribbean*, UNESCO, 2005
In English: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001389/138940E.pdf
In Spanish: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001389/138940S.pdf

*Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in East Asia*, UNESCO, 2004

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*Quelle sécurité ?*, UNESCO, 1997

*From Partial Insecurity to Global Security*, UNESCO/IHEDN, 1997
*Des insécurités partielles à la sécurité globale*, UNESCO/IHEDN, 1997

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Contact E-mail address: peace&security@unesco.org

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